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I. INTRODUCTION AND LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
This paper examines whether decreases in a firm’s carbon emissions causes 
that firm’s profit to increase. The premise is that consumers concerned about climate 
change prefer products that are less carbon intensive. Carbon intensity is the amount 
carbon emitted due to the production and consumption of one unit of a good. Consumers 
experience disutility when their actions cause CO2 concentration to rise, harming the 
environment and other people. Because of this disutility, they are willing to pay a higher 
price for relatively less carbon intensive products. For example, a consumer may decide 
to shop for groceries at Whole Foods rather than Cub Foods. Similarly, a consumer may 
decide to purchase a Tesla Model 3 (an electric car) instead of a Toyota Corolla (a 
gasoline car). The idea is that consumers can differentiate carbon intensities between 
otherwise similar products. 
Firms have an opportunity to affect the demand curve they face by reducing their 
carbon intensity, but to do so involves an investment cost. There are many ways a firm 
may reduce carbon intensity. They could switch to low-carbon energy sources, purchase 
more energy efficient capital, research new production technology, generate energy 
onsite, et cetera. The common theme is that all of these options have a cost. Firms must 
maximize profits by choosing how much to invest in carbon intensity reduction. 
Taking such actions to reduce emissions is one form of Corporate Social 
Responsibility (CSR). CSR is defined as “meeting the needs of a company’s direct and 
indirect stakeholders (employees, clients, pressure groups, communities, etc.), without 
compromising its ability to meet the needs of future stakeholders as well” (Dyllick and 
Hockerts 2002). A stakeholder is “any group or individual who can affect or is affected by 
the achievement of the organization's objective” (Freeman 1984). In the context of 
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carbon emissions, stakeholders include anyone in the world who experiences the costs 
of climate change. CSR does not mean that firms act altruistically; a firm that reduces 
carbon emissions to maximize profits also participates in CSR. That is the concern of 
this paper: whether reduction in carbon intensity increases profit, holding other 
determinants of profit constant. 
 There is a vast economic literature discussing the theoretical and empirical 
implications of CSR. Motivations for empirical research in CSR today come from 
theoretical arguments first made 60 years ago. Economists observed that spending on 
CSR per firm quadrupled between 1950 and 2000 (Caplow 2001). The earliest economic 
writing criticized this behavior. Levitt (1958) argued on purely theoretical grounds that 
firms destroyed wealth when they spent resources on objectives other than maximizing 
their own profits. In a famous New York Times article, Milton Friedman (1970) argued 
that firms spending resources on CSR was theft from their stockholders, managers, and 
employees. Friedman’s explanation for the increase in CSR spending was “political 
subversion” of the decision-makers within firms. Margolis (2003) has retroactively called 
this anti-CSR school of thought “Economic Contractarianism.” 
 Two economic theories, called the Stakeholder Theories, developed in response 
to Levitt and Friedman’s criticisms (Freeman 1984). The first was normative Stakeholder 
Theory, which argued that firms had an ethical obligation to their stakeholders. The 
second was descriptive Stakeholder Theory, which argued that firms that spent money 
on CSR were profit-maximizing, and searched for evidence to support that claim. The 
descriptive theory said that consumers preferred to purchase products from firms whom 
they deemed good. Therefore, monopolistically competitive firms could affect demand 
through investment in CSR. The descriptive theory directly rebutted the Economic 
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Contractarian argument; by engaging in CSR, firms created wealth. This thesis tests the 
hypotheses from descriptive Stakeholder Theory, as I seek to learn whether CSR is 
consistent with profit-maximizing behavior. 
 The CSR literature changed from a theoretical debate to a search for empirical 
evidence regarding Stakeholder Theory and Economic Contractarianism. Moskowitz 
(1972) wrote the first empirical work, finding a positive correlation between CSR and 
share prices by looking at a panel of 14 firms. Vance (1975) took the same dataset as 
Moskowitz and showed that these companies grew slower than their non-CSR peers on 
the S&P 500 and Dow Jones Indices. A meta-analysis by Margolis (2003) found that 
between 1972 and 2002 there were 127 studies searching for a causal relationship 
between CSR and financial performance. Margolis concluded that the total results of 
these studies suggested a weak positive relationship. He found that 70 of the studies 
concluded that there was a positive relationship, while 57 of the studies found no 
relationship, a negative relationship, or mixed results. Margolis stipulated, however, that 
the majority of these studies failed to address problems with empirical estimation that 
were common across the literature: omitted variables, endogeneity, poor samples, and 
unreliable measures of CSR and financial performance dependent variables. 
 Since the late 1990s, the literature has made efforts to address the estimation 
problems laid out by Margolis. Three dependent variables have become common as 
measures of financial performance. 1The most common measure is share prices (Curran 
and Moran 2007; van Dijken 2007; Consolandi 2009; and Cheung 2010). These papers 
                                                          
1 In addition to these analyses of high market value companies in the US stock exchanges, there I some 
studies that use smaller samples. For example, Wagner (2002) looks at the relationship between forest 
sustainability practices and profit in the paper industry. Curran and Moran (2007) examines at the shocks 
in stock prices of companies that I recently included or deleted from the FTSE4Good UK 50 Index. Both 
papers found a positive relationship between CSR and profit. 
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seek to answer whether CSR creates wealth for investors. But share prices do not 
necessarily reflect market fundamentals. It could be the case that prices change 
according to expected future profit and other variables in financial markets. What 
investors expect to happen to profits in the future may differ from what actually happens 
to profits in the future. If that’s the case, then a positive relationship between share 
prices and CSR does not necessarily mean that profit increases as a result of the CSR 
action, meaning that the conclusions of those papers do not fully answer the question 
posed by this paper2. The next most common measure of financial performance is 
Tobin’s Q (Lo and Sheu 2007; Wagner 2010; Garcia-Castro et al. 2010) 3. This measure 
falls to some of the same methodological problems as share prices because the 
numerator is determined by the price of shares. The advantage of Tobin’s Q is that it 
measures expectations of profit against that actual value of assets, therefore controlling 
for overestimated expectations. The final measures of financial performance are various 
accounting measures such return on assets and accounting profit (López et al. 2007; 
Garcia Castro et al. 2010). These dependent variables are less sensitive to forces on 
financial markets. Conclusions about the relationship between financial performance and 
CSR vary within all dependent variables, so the choice of dependent variable cannot 
explain the variation in estimation results.  
Some recent work has found that the inclusion of certain control variables affects 
the results. Specifically, a set of papers found that controlling for firm size, industry, and 
risk (of investment) changes the results of the effect of CSR on stock price (Aupperle et 
                                                          
2 However, if share prices do accurately indicate current period profit, then the conclusions of Curran and 
Moran (2007); van Dijken (2007); Consolandi (2009); and Cheung (2010) do reveal information about the 
CSR-profit relationship. The conclusions I mixed. 
3 The Tobin's Q ratio is calculated as the market value of a company divided by the replacement value of 
the firm's assets (Investopedia 2016). 
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al., 1985; Coombs and Gilley, 2005; Hillman and Keim, 2001; Pava and Krausz, 1996; 
Waddock and Graves, 1997b). The results of these papers vary, but they all look at 
stock price as a dependent variable explained by various measures of CSR. Firm size 
may matter because it affects the visibility of CSR actions to consumers. People are 
more likely to notice Target’s CSR activities than those of Georgetown Cupcakes. The 
same reasoning applies to the industry control variable. Consumers and stakeholders 
are more knowledgeable about downstream industries like retail than upstream 
industries like iron ore mining.  
Wagner (2010) found that including the advertising intensity of the markets of 
firms in his panel data set increased the positive significance of the relationship between 
CSR and financial performance. Advertising intensive industries are more sensitive to 
changes in public perception. CSR has the effect of boosting the company’s public 
image. McWilliams and Siegel (2000) show that including R&D intensity decreases the 
significance of the relationship, but that it remains positive. The reason may be that R&D 
intensive companies have higher return investments to make other than CSR, so the 
R&D intensive companies that do invest in CSR experience lower profit.  
I have read one paper that controls for endogeneity between profit and CSR. The 
argument for endogeneity is that firms that earn more profit can afford to invest more in 
CSR. Garcia-Castro et al. (2010) use a set of three instrumental variables to predict 
CSR ratings according to KLD4 score. The instrumental variables are an industry 
dummy, corporate governance measures, and inclusion on the S&P 500 (to proxy for 
visibility). Garcia-Castro et al. observe that when these instruments are included, the 
                                                          
4 A stock index that provides social responsibility ratings for all companies included in the index. 
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relationship goes from significantly positive to insignificantly negative. They conclude 
that more work must be done to control for endogeneity between profit and CSR. 
 This paper contributes to the literature by examining whether carbon intensity 
reductions result in greater profit. I use carbon emissions data from surveys conducted 
by CDP, a non-profit organization. These surveys are distributed every year to the 500 
largest companies in the world measured by market capitalization. Carbon emissions are 
an objective quantity, unlike many of subjective indices previously used in the literature 
such as KLD scores and inclusion on the Dow-Jones sustainability index. I can compare 
and measure the differences in carbon intensities between firms, whereas indices are 
not as comparable. This characteristic of my data allow me to apply a difference-in-
difference method to measure the effect of carbon emissions on profit, a method 
previously unused in the literature. The difference-in-difference model controls for 
variables that would otherwise confound the estimation. In addition to the new 
application of empirical techniques, this paper develops a theoretical model to explain 
consumer and firm behavior with respect to carbon emissions. 
 The empirical models all find a significant negative relationship between profit 
and carbon intensity. Profit increases as a company become less carbon intense. The 
results also suggest that carbon intensity matters in some industries but not others. Data 
constraints prevent me from drawing conclusions about specific industry effects due to 
small numbers of observations in some industries. I conclude that the results are 
evidence in support of the theory that companies can increase profit by decreasing 
carbon intensity. There are significant questions about the results addressed in the 
robustness section. 
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The rest of the paper proceeds as follows.  Section II develops a theoretical 
model to explain how companies can earn greater profit through reductions in carbon 
intensity. Section III discusses the data and their advantages and disadvantages. 
Section IV explains the empirical estimation technique. Section V shows the results. 
Section VI tests the robustness of results and lays out unaddressed potential 
weaknesses. Section VII concludes. 
 
II. THEORY 
The model developed in this section aims to explain the relationship between 
changes in carbon intensity and profit in an oligopolistic market. There are two profit-
maximizing firms that produce goods (𝑋1and 𝑋2) with different carbon intensities for each 
good. The model occurs over two periods. In the first period, the firms emit the same 
amount of carbon per unit produced (aka carbon intensity). They may invest I to reduce 
their carbon intensity in the next period. A greater investment results in greater reduction 
in carbon intensity. In the second period each firm faces a different demand curve 
(unless they invested nothing in the first period). 
Consumers are endowed with income N and choose to consume some quantity 
of the two goods. They maximize utility function 𝑈(𝑋1, 𝑋2, 𝐶), subject to their income 
constraint. The variable 𝐶 is the total carbon emissions produced by goods consumed, 
and is a function of 𝑋1and 𝑋2. The utility function could be expressed only as a function 
of 𝑋1and 𝑋2, but keeping the 𝐶 in the model makes it clear how carbon emissions affect 
consumer and producer behavior. 
The key to the model is that the carbon emissions variable in the utility function 
enables firms to differentiate themselves and affect demand. Firms make their 
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investment decision based on expectations about what the other firm will invest. The 
firms achieve Nash Equilibrium when they maximize profits across the two periods given 
their expectations about the other firm’s strategy. 
 
a) Demand 
 The goal of this subsection is to show how consumer preferences about carbon 
intensities affect the demand curve. Consumers seek to maximize their utility 
𝑈(𝑋1, 𝑋2, 𝐶). Assume for the moment that the marginal disutility of carbon emissions 
does not depend on the quantity of goods and that the marginal utilities of goods do not 
depend on carbon emission levels. In other words, I am assuming that the utility function 
takes some additive form 𝑈 = 𝑓(𝑥1, 𝑥2) + 𝑔(𝐶). Then the constrained optimization 
problem requires the consumer to meet these three first-order conditions: 
max 𝜃𝑥1𝑥2𝜆 = 𝑈(𝑋1, 𝑋2, 𝐶) −  𝜆(𝑃1𝑋1 + 𝑃2𝑋2 − 𝑁) 
(1)  
𝜕𝜃
𝜕𝑥1
=  
𝜕𝑈
𝜕𝑥1
+
𝜕𝑈
𝜕𝐶
𝜕𝐶
𝜕𝑥1
− 𝜆𝑃1 = 0 
(2)  
𝜕𝜃
𝜕𝑥2
=  
𝜕𝑈
𝜕𝑥2
+
𝜕𝑈
𝜕𝐶
𝜕𝐶
𝜕𝑥2
− 𝜆𝑃2 = 0 
(3)  
𝜕𝜃
𝜕𝜆
=  𝑁 − 𝑃1𝑋1 − 𝑃2𝑋2 = 0 
 The 
𝜕𝑈
𝜕𝑥𝑖
 terms in each equation represent that marginal utility provided by the 
good. The 
𝜕𝑈
𝜕𝐶
 terms represent how much the utility changes for each unit of carbon 
emitted, and 
𝜕𝐶
𝜕𝑥𝑖
 is the carbon intensity of the good. Combining the three first-order 
conditions, I get 
(4) 
𝜕𝑈
𝜕𝑥1
+
𝜕𝑈
𝜕𝐶
𝜕𝐶
𝜕𝑥1
𝑃1
=
𝜕𝑈
𝜕𝑥2
+
𝜕𝑈
𝜕𝐶
𝜕𝐶
𝜕𝑥2
𝑃2
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 The interpretation of equation 4 is that the sum of the marginal utility of the good 
and the marginal disutility of carbon emissions per dollar must be equal for both goods. 
This equation can illuminate how changes in carbon intensity can affect the consumption 
of goods. Suppose that the carbon intensity of 𝑥1 increases. I know that 
𝜕𝑈
𝜕𝐶
 is negative 
because I have assumed that consumers receive disutility from the carbon emissions of 
their goods. The sum of marginal utilities decreases.  
In order for equation 4 to hold, either the marginal utility of 𝑥1 must increase or 
marginal utility of 𝑥2 must decrease. The consumer in this model has no control over the 
price or carbon intensity of either good. For the marginal utility of 𝑥1 to increase, the 
quantity consumed of 𝑥1 must decrease (assuming that there exists diminishing marginal 
utility of the good). The end result is that the consumer reacts to the increase in 𝑥1’s 
carbon intensity by decreasing consumption of good 𝑥1 and increasing consumption of 
𝑥2.  
Suppose that the goods are identical in every way except for carbon intensity. 
The reason I want to do this is so that I can think about a duopolistic market with 
identical goods. Now the marginal utilities of the goods must be equal. The only 
difference between the numerators in equation 4 comes from the marginal disutility of 
carbon emissions. Equation 4 indicates that the result is a corner solution, because the 
less carbon intense good always has greater marginal utility per dollar, as long as prices 
are held constant. Realistically, the less carbon intense good would probably have a 
greater price than the other, which means that a corner solution is not necessary. 
If I specify a function for utility, then I can derive a demand curve for the goods. 
Suppose that a consumer’s utility function is  
(5)  𝑈 = 𝑥1
𝛼𝑥2
𝛽
𝐶𝛾  
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such that 0 < 𝛼 < 1, 0 < 𝛽 < 1, and 𝛾 < 0. I am returning to a utility function in which 
consumers receive different marginal utilities from each good. Note that this specific 
utility function does not fit in the general case considered in equations 1-4 because this 
function does not assume that the utility function is additive. The demand for 𝑥1 is5  
(6) 𝑥1 =  
−𝑃2𝐶
𝛾(𝛼+𝛽)
𝑃2
𝜕𝑈
𝜕𝐶
𝜕𝐶
𝜕𝑥1
−
𝜕𝑈
𝜕𝐶
𝜕𝐶
𝜕𝑥2
∗𝑃1−
𝛽𝐶𝛾𝑃2𝑃1
𝐼
 
It is difficult to interpret the meaning of individual terms in the demand function, 
but I can understand how quantity demanded changes with the parameters. The two 
parameters of interest are the carbon intensities of 𝑥1 and 𝑥2. If I derive 𝑥1with respect to 
the carbon intensities, the resulting equations are 
(7) 
𝜕𝑥1
𝜕
𝜕𝐶
𝜕𝑥1
 = 
𝐶𝛾(𝛼+𝛽)
𝜕𝑈
𝜕𝐶
(
𝜕𝐶
𝜕𝑥1
)
2 
(8) 
𝜕𝑥1
𝜕𝐶
𝜕𝑥2
=  
−𝑃2𝐶
𝛾(𝛼+𝛽)
𝜕𝑈
𝜕𝐶
(
𝜕𝐶
𝜕𝑥2
)
2
𝑃1
 
Because I have assumed that 
𝜕𝑈
𝜕𝐶
 is negative, I know that the quantity demanded 
of 𝑥1 decreases with the carbon intensity of 𝑥1 and increases with the carbon intensity of 
𝑥2. Note that these derivations assumed that carbon intensity does not change with the 
quantities demanded. If that were not the case, then I would have to account for the 
carbon level term remaining inside 
𝜕𝑈
𝜕𝐶
. This assumption may not reflect a market in which 
companies experience economies of scale. For instance, it may require a certain amount 
of energy to run a machine for an hour, regardless of the production of that machine. 
                                                          
5 The derivation of equation 6 is provided in the appendix 
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Therefore, the company has to consume no additional energy to produce more goods as 
long as the machine is not at capacity.  
The important result of equations 7 and 8 is that changes in carbon intensity can 
decrease quantity demanded decreases while keeping price constant. Graphically, this 
is a downward shift of the demand curve. If producers can decrease their carbon 
intensity by changing production technology, then they can affect the demand curve they 
face in the future. I have demonstrated that when consumers receive disutility from 
carbon emissions, changes in carbon intensity cause downward shifts in the demand 
curve. I showed this generally for the utility functions that are additive (𝑈 = 𝑓(𝑥1, 𝑥2) +
𝑔(𝐶)) and also for a particular non-additive utility function (𝑈 = 𝑥1
𝛼𝑥2
𝛽
𝐶𝛾). I also had to 
impose the assumption that carbon intensity does not change with quantity produced. 
Relaxing these assumptions does not necessarily alter the results of these models, but it 
depends on the specific utility and carbon emissions functions. 
 
b) Supply 
This subsection explains how producers choose the level of carbon intensity 
investment which maximizes profits. In the first period, the market is a homogenous 
duopoly. They face the same price which is a function of the sum of their produced 
quantities. For the sake of simplicity, I assume that the firms face a linear demand 
function derived from a cumulative utility function which includes a term for carbon 
emissions. 
(9)  𝑝 = 𝐴 − 𝐵 ∗ 𝑋 
(10)  𝑋 =  x1 + x2 
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The parameters A and B are constants. Let each firm faces the same marginal cost of 
production. Given equations 9 and 10 and that firm 1 maximizes profits, I find that the 
reaction curve for firms 1 and 2 are 
(11)  x1 =  
𝐴−𝐵∗x2−𝑀𝐶
2𝐵
 
(12)  x2 =  
𝐴−𝐵∗x1−𝑀𝐶
2𝐵
  
The parameter MC is the marginal cost of both firms 1 and 2. The profit 
maximizing quantities are attained through the reaction curves. Solving for x1 and x2 
results in 
(13) 𝑥1 = 𝑥2 =
𝐴−𝑀𝐶
3𝐵
  
Both firms produce the same quantity. The potential difference between firms A 
and B in period 1 is their expectations about what the other firm will invest. As 
demonstrated in the discussion of consumer demand, the demand for a good depends 
on both its own carbon intensity as well as the carbon intensity of the other firm. 
Therefore, the expected return on investment in carbon intensity may depend on the 
competitor’s investment. The objective of the firms in period 1 is to maximize profits in 
the period while choosing the level of investment that maximizes period 2 profits minus 
investment. Since period 1 profit does not depend on investment, the quantity produced 
in period 1 has no effect on the investment decision.   
The market in period 2 becomes a heterogeneous duopoly because the goods 
are differentiated through different fixed carbon emissions for each firm. Now the firms 
face their own demand curves. Specifically, 
(14)  𝑃1 = 𝐴1 − 𝐵1x2 − 𝐶1x1 
(15)  𝑃2 = 𝐴2 − 𝐵2x2 − 𝐶2x1 
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Note that the price of each good is a function of the quantity of both goods. This reflects 
that the goods are similar enough that one firm’s production decision affects the 
consumer’s willingness to pay for the other. But the goods are different enough to have 
different prices. 
The parameters that characterize the demand curves are 𝐴𝑖, 𝐵𝑖 , and 𝐶𝑖. These 
parameters are determined by the consumer’s utility function. As shown in the 
discussion of consumer demand, an increase in the carbon intensity of 𝑥1 shifts its 
demand curve downward but shifts the demand for 𝑥2 upward. For example, suppose 
the consumer’s utility function is such that  
(16) 𝐴1 = 𝑓(
𝜕𝐶
𝜕𝑥1
, 𝜕𝐶
𝜕𝑥2
) 
(17) 𝐴2 = 𝑔(
𝜕𝐶
𝜕𝑥1
, 𝜕𝐶
𝜕𝑥2
) 
 Under the assumption that consumers receive disutility from carbon emissions, 
𝐴1and 𝐴2 must increase with their own carbon intensities and decrease with the carbon 
intensity of the other good. To show how profit changes carbon intensity, I need to know 
how profit changes with 𝐴1 and 𝐴2. The reaction curves derived from equations (14) and 
(15) are 
(18) 𝑥1 =
𝐴1−𝑀𝐶−𝐵1𝑥2
2𝐶1
 
(19) 𝑥2 =
𝐴2−𝑀𝐶−𝐶2𝑥1
2𝐵2
 
The optimal quantities attained by substituting equations (18) and (19) are 
(20) 𝑥1 =
𝐴1−𝑀𝐶
2𝐶1
−
𝐵1𝐴2
4𝐶1𝐵2
1−
𝐵1𝐶2
2𝐵2
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(21) 𝑥2 =  
𝐴2−𝑀𝐶
2𝐶2
−
𝐵2𝐴1
4𝐶2𝐵1
1−
𝐵2𝐶1
2𝐵1
 
No definite statement can be made about the relationship between the quantities 
and the 𝐴𝑖 parameters. Taking the derivatives does not add any additional clarity. The 
direction of the derivatives depends on the other parameters in the demand equations. 
Therefore, no definite statement can be made about the relationship between profit and 
𝐴𝑖, and the conclusions of the model are ambiguous. Conclusions can only be drawn 
when information about the other parameters are known, which can only be learned 
empirically. 
Even if the profit-carbon intensity relationship is not ambiguous, the behavior of 
firms is still not clear. If the expected benefit of carbon intensity investment depends on 
the competitor’s carbon intensity, then firms have to make decisions based on the 
expected outcomes. Suppose that firms can only make a binary investment at a fixed 
cost. Consider decision tree 1. 
Decision Tree 1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Does Firm 
2 Invest? 
Yes 
No 
Does Firm 
1 Invest? 
Yes 
No 
Yes 
No 
Firm 1’s 
investment 
decision 
Payoff 
Firm 1: $200, Firm 2: $200 
Firm 1: $700, Firm 2: $100 
Firm 1: $100, Firm 2: $700 
Firm 1: $500, Firm 2: $500 
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 The quantities in parentheses represent the expected net benefits of each 
decision combination. Both firms investing is the worst total outcome because they 
spend resources investing in carbon intensity reduction but gain no advantage in carbon 
intensity over the competitor. Yet both firms still invest because the outcome is better for 
investing regardless of what the competitor does. In the game with only two time 
periods, cooperation is impossible because both firms always experience the temptation 
to break any agreement, and they each know that the other firm has experiences that 
temptation. In a game with infinite periods, it is possible for the firms to cooperate 
because there is no definite end period in which firms are tempted to break the 
agreement. 
 Because the profit-carbon intensity relationship is theoretically ambiguous, the 
true payoff structure could differ greatly from decision tree 1. Consider decision tree 2: 
Decision Tree 2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Does Firm 
2 Invest? 
Yes 
No 
Does Firm 
1 Invest? 
Yes 
No 
Yes 
No 
Firm 1’s 
investment 
decision 
Payoff 
Firm 1: $200, Firm 2: $200 
Firm 1: $700, Firm 2: $300 
Firm 1: $300, Firm 2: $700 
Firm 1: $500, Firm 2: $500 
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In decision tree 2, it is not clear what the firms will do. If firm 2 invests, then firm 1 
is better off not investing. If firm 2 does not invest, then firm 1 is better off investing. If the 
firms cannot coordinate their actions, then the firms will make a decision based on 
expected outcomes and the expected decision of their competitor. Note that decision 
tree 2 still maintains the same assumption as in decision tree 1 that an investor has an 
advantage over a non-investor and that both firms investing is the worst outcome for 
them. 
In summary, the theoretical model makes ambiguous predictions. The ambiguity 
comes at two levels. First, it is not clear that reductions in carbon intensity necessarily 
result in greater profit. Second, it is not clear that firms would invest in carbon intensity 
reduction even if it can increase profits. The model makes many simplifying assumptions 
that may not reflect the real world. For these reasons, empirical estimation of the profit-
carbon intensity relationship is crucial. 
 
III. DATA AND SUMMARY STATISTICS 
 The carbon emissions data for this paper come from CDP6, a non-profit 
organization whose mission is to facilitate transparency of companies’ environmental 
impact around the world. CDP publishes a data set that reports the carbon emissions of 
the top 500 companies in the world by market capitalization7. The data span three years 
2011-20138. I use only the data of companies from the United States because my 
financial data only includes United States companies. There are 343 company-year 
                                                          
6 CDP was formerly known as the Carbon Disclosure Project. 
7 Market capitalization is the total value of a publicly traded company’s shares. In other words, the price 
of its shares times the total number of shares. 
8 The CDP survey has been taken for more years than this time span, but I only have access to these years 
due to my own financial constraints. 
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observations in the data set. Some companies appear for less than three years because 
they entered or exited the sample during the collection period. CDP collects the data 
through survey responses, to which companies respond on a voluntary basis. The US 
subsample of the survey has 343 respondents and 124 non-respondents, providing a 
73% response rate. The number of non-respondents is great enough to cause response 
bias. The robustness section addresses the possibility and consequences of response 
bias in the results.  
 CDP reports two different types of emissions. Scope 1 emissions refer to 
emissions which happen on-site and under the control of the company. These make up 
the majority of emissions for most companies. Scope 2 emissions are from purchased 
energy, heat, and steam. Note that on-site energy generation falls into scope 1 
emissions. The advantage of including only scope 1 emissions in the econometric model 
is that changes in energy prices would not confound the profit-emissions relationship, 
unless there is heterogeneity in the cost of on-site energy generation. On the other hand, 
scope 1 emissions would not pick up the effect of reductions in a company’s energy 
intensity, an important source of carbon emissions reduction. Our primary models use 
the sum of scope 1 and scope 2 emissions as the independent variable, but I also 
estimate with the separate emissions types for robustness. 
Carbon intensity is the emissions divided by revenue9. I use carbon intensity 
instead of carbon emissions because intensity relates the quantity of carbon emissions 
to the size of the company. Another possible measure of carbon intensity would be 
carbon emissions per quantity produced. This measure better corresponds with our 
theoretical model, but there are problems with the quantity measure. Different products 
                                                          
9 All financial variables are in real terms. 
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of the same company can have different carbon emissions. I would have to use a 
weighted average of carbon emissions among different products. The data to perform 
this calculation at the company level do not exist for most companies in the sample. 
Carbon emissions divided by revenue is a less data-intensive alternative that should not 
alter results. Of course, the ideal paper would use both measures. 
Figure 1 shows the distribution of carbon intensity. Carbon intensity follows 
approximately a log-normal distribution with some extreme values along the tail. There 
are two outliers at 0.9931 and 0.9130 tons CO2e/USD. Both of the outliers are 
observations of Dominion Resources, a utilities company on the east coast of the United 
States. All of the values of carbon intensities are reasonable. It is not surprising that 
there are extremes in carbon intensity because the sample is diverse among industries. 
Energy utilities naturally have higher carbon intensity than Walmart. It also makes sense 
that the order of magnitude of carbon intensity is low. For large companies, revenue is in 
the billions of USD.  
The financial data come from EDGAR, the SEC database listing all 10-K and 10-
Q filings10. All publicly traded companies in the United States are required to submit 
these filings to the SEC each year. They provide much financial information about each 
company. I use the revenue, assets, and profit data from each filing. All values are in 
real terms. Profit is the dependent variable in all regressions. The assets variable refers 
to the total value of durable goods held by a company. I use this variable as a control in 
some regressions. Revenue is only used to calculate carbon intensity. Every company in 
the sample has these data. Figures 2, 3, and 4 show the distributions of the financial 
data used in this paper.  
                                                          
10 Thank you to the writers at StockPup (http://www.stockpup.com/data/) for extracting the data from 
EDGAR and sharing their work for free. 
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The financial variables also follow a log-normal distribution. This distribution makes 
sense for revenue and assets because a company must make at least certain amount of 
revenue to be in the top 500 companies by market capitalization. The minimum cutoff 
means that by definition all the extremes occur on the right side, instead of the left side. 
Table 1: Summary Statistics (Years: 2011-2013) 
     
Variable Observations Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
Minimum Maximum 
Carbon 
Intensity 
343 0.000486 0.1126 0.0000872 0.9931 
 
Revenue 
(Ten Millions) 
343 200 296 8.34 2110 
 
Profit (Ten 
Millions)  
343 20.7 25.9 -3.048 197 
 
Assets (Ten 
Millions) 
343 708 1670 21.1 10500 
 
All of the independent variables have a standard deviation greater than its mean. 
The high variation in the sample means that the econometric models are more capable 
of finding a signal in the data. Profit has one less observation because there was one 
negative value for unlogged profit in the sample. As discussed above, the extremes 
occur on the right side of the distributions, which explains why the maxima tend to be 
much further from the means than the minima. The effect of outliers will be discussed in 
the robustness section. 
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Figure 111 
 
Figure 212 
 
                                                          
11 All values for carbon intensity I positive. 
12 There I two company-years with negative profit. 
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Figure 313 
 
Figure 414 
 
                                                          
13 All values for assets I positive. 
14 All values for revenue I positive. 
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Table 2 shows the number of observations in each industry. The 5 industries with 
the greatest number of observations are finance and insurance, information, 
manufacturing 2, manufacturing 3, and wholesale trade. The differences in the size of 
industry groups matters for the estimation of models with industry-carbon intensity 
interaction terms. Small groups will have larger standard errors and smaller t-scores. 
The model is likely commit type 2 errors when industry groups are small.  
These data work well to empirically test the model laid out in the theory section. 
First, large companies are much more visible to consumers than small consumers. 
Greater visibility means that consumers can have information by which they may make 
their consumption choices. In terms of the theoretical model, consumers may place a 
greater weight on carbon emissions in visible industries (i.e. the gamma parameter is 
more negative). Second, many of the companies in the sample are in common 
industries, meaning that I can observe within industry effects of carbon emissions on 
profit. 
 The trickiest part of these data is determining whether they represent what 
consumers actually observe about carbon emissions. It seems unlikely that a significant 
number of consumers research the specific carbon emissions of the products they 
purchase. Rather, consumers may make decisions based on general feelings about 
carbon intensity. For instance, most consumers know and believe that a Toyota Prius 
emits less carbon than the comparable Toyota Corolla. Another question is where 
consumers get their information. For example, most companies publish a Corporate 
Social Responsibility Report15 detailing their efforts to reduce environmental impact. 
Consumers may use those as sources of information. This is only a problem if 
                                                          
15 Example: http://www.generalmills.com/~/media/Files/GRR/GRR_2016_report.pdf?la=en 
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companies report different carbon emissions between the CSR report and CDP survey 
response.  
Table 2: Industry tabulation 
Industry Observations 
Adminstrative and Waste Management 4 
Construction 6 
Entertainment  10 
Finance and Insurance 66 
Food Services 3 
Information 34 
Manufacturing 1 12 
Manufacturing 2 45 
Manufacturing 3 45 
Mining and Gas Extraction 35 
Professional, Scientific, and Technical 
Services 
9 
Real Estate 5 
Retain Trade 1 27 
Retail Trade 2 12 
Transportation 15 
Utilities 14 
Wholesale Trade 30 
 
Another problem is that marketing may matter more than actual carbon 
emissions performance. I could argue that marketing would not work without actual 
results to support it, but it would be naive to assume that marketers need evidence to 
run an effective marketing campaign. If there is a difference between our data and what 
consumers observe due to marketing, then our models should fail to find a signal of the 
emissions-profit relationship or find a weaker signal than what I would otherwise find. 
 
 
IV. ESTIMATION EQUATIONS 
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Every empirical model in this paper uses a random effects estimator. The data do 
not contain enough observations for each company to take advantage of fixed effects. 
The panel      contains at most three years for a company. Each model has a fixed effect 
term for the year of the observation. I use logged profit as the dependent variable 
because the order of magnitude of profit is much greater than carbon intensity. An 
unlogged dependent variable would make the model heteroskedastic and may 
underestimate the statistical significance of the coefficients. The independent variables 
are unlogged. After calculating the log-level regressions, I derive the carbon elasticity of 
profit at the mean values of carbon intensity and profit. These elasticities are the results 
of interest for the models without interactions terms. For the models with interactions 
terms, I simply use log-log regressions because it is difficult to attain an estimate of the 
elasticities of individual groups when the groups are small. 
I begin with the simplest model for the relationship between profit and carbon 
emissions: 
(E1) 𝜋𝑖𝑡 = 𝐵1 + 𝐵2𝑐𝑖𝑡 + 𝜃𝑡 +  𝜀𝑖𝑡 
 
The symbol 𝜋𝑖𝑡 indicates logged profit, 𝑐𝑖𝑡 indicates carbon intensity of a single 
company-year observation, 𝜃𝑡 is the dummy for year, and 𝜀𝑖𝑡 is the error term for an 
observation it. The coefficient 𝐵2 signifies the percentage by which profit increases after 
a one unit change in carbon intensity16. This model says little about whether carbon 
emissions cause the company-year to earn more profit, but subsequent, more 
informative models build off it. 
                                                          
16 I used a specification of the STATA margins command to calculate the elasticity from 𝐵2.   
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Model E2 controls for the heterogeneity in profit between industries by adding 
dummies for each industry using 2-digit NAICS codes: 
(E2) 𝜋𝑖𝑡 = 𝐵1 + 𝐵2𝑐𝑖𝑡 + 𝜃𝑡 + 𝜇𝑗 +  𝜀𝑖𝑡 
The symbol 𝜇𝑖 indicates the dummy for the industry of observation i. Industry variation 
could explain a negative elasticity because industries that are characteristically lower 
carbon intensity could earn more profit. For example, it consumes much more energy for 
a factory to manufacture a car than a lawyer to try a case, even though the total of 
lawyer’s fees at the end of a trial may sum to the price of a car. The dummies pull out 
the mean profit for each industry, meaning that the coefficient 𝐵2does not pick up the 
effect of between industry effects.  
This is where the industry definitions matter. If industry definitions are not 
granular enough – that is, the 2-digit NAICS codes do not capture variation between 
industries – then the estimation of 𝐵2 may be inconsistent because heterogeneity in 
carbon intensity and profit between industries biases the coefficient. If the codes are too 
detailed because a company produces many different products, then the estimation is 
inefficient because there are more industry groups than necessary for a consistent 
estimation. Ideally, I would use fixed effects to control for time-invariant characteristics of 
firms, but the available data do not allow for such a model. 
The next model controls for heterogeneity in energy consuming capital by using 
the value of assets as a proxy for a company’s use of capital: 
(E3) 𝜋𝑖𝑡 = 𝐵1 + 𝐵2𝑐𝑖𝑡 + 𝐵3𝐾𝑖𝑡+ 𝜃𝑡 + 𝜇𝑗 +  𝜀𝑖𝑡 
The symbol 𝐾𝑖𝑡 indicates the amount of assets owned by a company in year t. 
Heterogeneity in energy consuming capital could positively bias the coefficient 𝐵2 and 
elasticity. Clearly, not all assets result in carbon emissions. Financial assets do not emit 
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carbon, but manufacturing capital assets do. The assets variable picks up more 
heterogeneity than necessary, but it is not important to estimate a consistent coefficient 
for assets. 
 The fourth model is the same as model E3 but with differences between carbon 
emissions and profit. 
(E4) 𝜋𝑖𝑡 − 𝜋𝑖(𝑡−1) = 𝐵1 + 𝐵2(𝑐𝑖𝑡 − 𝑐𝑖(𝑡−1)) + 𝐵3𝐾𝑖𝑡+ 𝜃𝑡 + 𝜇𝑗 +  𝜀𝑖𝑡 
The coefficient 𝐵2 is interpreted differently in E4 than the other models. Here it means 
when the difference in carbon intensity increases by 1, the percent change in profit 
increases by 𝐵2 dollars. 
The differences model controls for industry level characteristics. As explained 
above, industry heterogeneity could explain a negative coefficient if not properly 
controlled in models E1 though E3. In the differences model, industry heterogeneity in 
the levels of carbon intensity and profit could not explain a negative 𝐵2 coefficient. The 
story would have to be that some industries gain more profit faster than others and that 
those same industries tend to decrease their carbon intensity from year to year. That 
story seems less likely than the industry heterogeneity confounding story in models E1 
thorough E3.  
The differences model controls for any variable that is confounding in levels but 
not differences. Heterogeneity in energy efficiency is another example. In the level 
models, energy efficient companies have higher profit because of lower energy costs but 
emit less carbon because they can produce the same output while consuming less 
energy. Therefore, the result is a negative 𝐵2 coefficient. But in the differences model, 
the confounding story must be that firms which have an increasing rate of profit gains 
also are becoming more energy efficient each year. Although the differences model 
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made the problem a little better, this still is a believable explanation for a negative 
coefficient. The robustness section addresses changes in energy efficiency as a 
confounding variable. 
The last two models add industry interaction terms to models E3 and E4: 
(E5) 𝜋𝑖𝑡 = 𝐵1 + 𝐵2𝑐𝑖𝑡 + 𝐵3𝐾𝑖𝑡+𝐵4𝑐𝑖𝑡𝜇𝑗 +  𝜃𝑡 + 𝜇𝑗 +  𝜀𝑖𝑡 
(E6)  𝜋𝑖𝑡 − 𝜋𝑖(𝑡−1) = 𝐵1 + 𝐵2(𝑐𝑖𝑡 − 𝑐𝑖(𝑡−1)) + 𝐵3𝐾𝑖𝑡+𝐵4(𝑐𝑖𝑡 − 𝑐𝑖(𝑡−1))𝜇𝑗 + 𝜃𝑡 +
𝜇𝑗 +  𝜀𝑖𝑡 
The interaction terms reflect variation in the effect of carbon emission on profit between 
industries. The model described in this paper’s theory section suggests that if 
consumers have less information about a firm, then the effect of carbon emissions on 
profit is diminished. Consumer information may vary at the industry level.  
 Profit relationships are difficult to estimate because many variables determine 
profit. Any of these variables which affects revenue or costs that also decreases energy 
intensity is a confounding variable. Energy intensity is one example. As a firm becomes 
more energy intense, carbon intensity decreases because the firm consumes less 
energy and profit increases because the firm experiences lesser costs. In order to 
address this problem, in part, I use the same models to estimate the revenue-carbon 
intensity relationship. Fewer variables confound that relationship. A negative coefficient 
on carbon intensity for these models is stronger evidence for the consumer-preference 
model described in section III. If that model is accurate, I expect to see consistent results 
for both profit and revenue. 
 Another challenge in empirical estimation is endogeneity. The argument is that 
profitable companies have more capital to make investments. Some of those 
investments may be reductions in carbon intensity. Therefore, profit causes lower carbon 
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intensity. The same argument also applies to revenue. I have no empirical tool to 
address endogeneity concerns. The theoretical arguments made in section III answer 
endogeneity on theoretical grounds.  
 
V. RESULTS 
Table 3 summarizes the most important regression result for profit models 1 
through 4 – carbon intensity elasticity of revenue. The elasticities are all significantly 
negative. The magnitude stays about the same for each model, except for model 4 (the 
differenced model) which has a different interpretation than models 1 through 3. The 
elasticities for the first four models seem reasonable. If carbon intensity halves, then 
profit increases by 10%. I expect to see an inelastic relationship because carbon 
emissions only makes up one part of consumer preferences. There are many other 
characteristics of goods about which consumer may care. If the results are robust, then 
they are evidence in support of the hypothesis that lower carbon intensity results in 
greater profit. 
One notable result is that R-squared is low in the first model without industry or 
asset controls, but increases five-fold with the controls. The low R-squared and low 
magnitude on the elasticities mean that carbon intensity explains only a small portion of 
variation in profit. It would have been concerning if the models suggested that changes 
in carbon intensity explained a large part of variation in profit. 
Table 4 presents the carbon intensity elasticities for revenue. The elasticities in 
the revenue models are similar to those in the profit models. All elasticities are around -
0.10 (except for the differenced models, which are around -0.02). These results are 
encouraging. They suggest that the changes to profit are occurring mostly through 
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revenue. The empirical results are consistent with consumer preferences being the 
cause of profit gains.  
The industry dummies are significant in the levels models but insignificant in the 
differenced models. This suggests that there is not much variation in first-order changes 
in profit between industries. Because there is no variation in profit at the industry level, 
the differenced model is robust to industry heterogeneity as a confounding explanation 
for the negative coefficient on carbon intensity. The confounding variables must be 
heterogeneity in first-order changes. The only surprising result is that the time dummies 
are not significant for any model except the differenced model. This suggests that profit 
does not tend to vary across years. 
The number of observations changes between the level model and the difference 
model because the first year for each company has no difference. There is no variation 
in profit for each year – as shown by the year dummy – so the dropped years should not 
bias the results in the differences. There are 142 companies in the data and 145 
observations dropped in the differenced model. The extra 3 are because 3 companies 
had observations in 2011 and 2013, so they dropped two observations in the differenced 
model.  
Regressions 5 and 6 add industry interaction terms to regressions 3 and 4. 
Figures 5 and 6 illustrate the elasticities calculated from the regressions. Regression 5 
finds that the coefficient is only significant for finance and insurance, manufacturing 1, 
manufacturing 2, mining and gas, and retail trade 2. Regression 6, the differenced 
model, finds that the coefficient is only significant for food service, finance and 
insurance, manufacturing 3, and mining and gas extraction. The takeaway from these 
results is that the characteristics of industries affect the profit-carbon intensity 
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relationship. However, these models do not do a good job identifying precisely for which 
industries it matters because some of the industry groups have fewer observations than 
the others. 
The industries that do have significant coefficients are industries more visible to 
consumers than other industries. Consumers interact directly with firms in the retail 
trade, food service, and insurance industries. Ethical consumers would be most 
concerned with the industries with which they directly interact. Therefore, it makes sense 
to see a strong effect of carbon intensity in those two industries. Manufacturing, mining, 
and gas companies do not fit that explanation because consumers do not purchase 
goods directly from those companies. Rather, these companies may have high 
consumer perception because they are the “usual suspects” of carbon emissions. 
Energy companies such as Exxon Mobile fall into these categories. 
Figures 7 and 8 show the results of the revenue interacted regressions. The most 
important result is that every industry that had a significant coefficient in figures 5 or 6 
also has a significant coefficient in figures 7 or 8, except for food services. This shows 
that carbon intensity is affecting profit through revenue. Two industries, retail and 
wholesale trade, had significant coefficients in the revenue figures but not the profit 
figure.  
Table 2 in summary statistics tabulates the number of observations in each 
industry. The 5 industries with the greatest number of observations are finance and 
insurance, information, manufacturing 2, manufacturing 3, and wholesale trade. Out of 
those 5 industries, only wholesale trade has an insignificant coefficient in neither 
regression 5 nor 6. Retail trade 2 and food services have a low number of observations 
but a positive coefficient in one of the models. The low number of observations for some 
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industries means that the model is likely to commit type 2 errors on the carbon intensity 
coefficients for those industries. This is supported by the fact that the industries with 
significant coefficients tend to have more observations than the industries with 
insignificant coefficients. It would not be wise to interpret figures 5 and 6 as showing 
exactly for which industries carbon emissions matters. Rather, one should conclude that 
there seems to be heterogeneity in the carbon intensity effect on profit between 
industries, and more information is needed to determine precisely how they differ. 
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Table 3: Profit Elasticities 17  
Model 
(E1) Base 
Model 
(E2) Industry 
Fixed Effects 
(E3) Asset Control 
+ Industry FE 
(E4) 
Differences 
Carbon Intensity 
Elasticity of Profit18 
-0.1025*** -0.1126*** -0.1094*** -0.0238*** 
Observations 343 343 343 197 
F-Statistic 8.47 4.42 7.60 2.50 
Adj. R-Squared 0.0617 0.1602 0.2791 0.1270 
***p<0.01 **p<0.05 *p<0.10 
 
 
Table 4: Revenue Elasticities 19  
Model 
(E1) Base 
Model 
(E2) Industry 
Fixed Effects 
(E3) Asset Control 
+ Industry FE 
(E4) 
Differences 
Carbon Intensity 
Elasticity of Revenue20 
-0.0910*** -0.1102*** -0.1070*** -0.01669*** 
Observations 343 343 343 197 
F-Statistic 5.30 4.83 8.19 2.98 
Adj. R-Squared 0.0363 0.1754 0.2961 0.2413 
***p<0.01 **p<0.05 *p<0.10 
 
 
  
                                                          
17 Table 3 summarizes the key results from the non-interacted profit regressions. Beginning from the left, 
each subsequent model adds one new complexity. The appendix contains the full regression results for 
each model. 
18 Carbon Elasticity of Profit is the elasticity between profit and carbon intensity. 
19 Table 4 summarizes the key results from the non-interacted revenue regressions. Beginning from the 
left, each subsequent model adds one new complexity. The appendix contains the full regression results 
for each model. 
20 Carbon Elasticity of Revenue is the elasticity between profit and revenue. 
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Figure 5: Profit Elasticities by Industry (Levels)  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6: Profit Elasticities by Industry (Differences)  
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Figure 7: Revenue Elasticities by Industry (Levels)  
 
 
Figure 8: Revenue Elasticities by Industry (Differences) 
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VI. ROBUSTNESS 
 There are a number of potential robustness concerns the results. Table 5 lists 
each potential robustness problem and its consequence for conclusions. 
Table 5: Robustness problems  
Robustness problem Consequences if unaddressed 
Within industry energy efficiency 
heterogeneity 
Inconsistent coefficient estimates 
Within industry low carbon energy price 
heterogeneity 
Inconsistent coefficient estimates 
Time Conclusions limited to sample time period 
Firm size Conclusions limited to sample firm and 
comparable firms 
Country heterogeneity Conclusions limited to United States and 
comparable countries 
Sampling bias Inconsistent coefficient estimates 
Results driven by outliers Conclusions limited out of sample 
 
 Some of these robustness problems have already been discussed in previous 
sections. The differenced model eliminates the effect of energy efficiency heterogeneity, 
but there could still be a confounding effect if firms that are gaining profit also are 
becoming more energy efficient. To test whether the results are robust to energy 
efficiency heterogeneity, I run the differences models (models 4 and 6) using only scope 
1 emissions, which do not include emissions from purchases electricity. The result is still 
a significantly negative coefficient. Scope 1 emissions include emissions generated on-
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site, meaning that heterogeneity in the differences of on-site energy generation 
efficiency within industries could explain a negative coefficient. For that to be the case, 
on-site energy generation would also have to make up a large portion of companies’ 
energy sources, but most electricity is purchased from electric utilities. It seems unlikely 
that energy efficiency confounds the coefficient in the difference models. 
 Low carbon energy price heterogeneity could also explain a negative coefficient. 
If some companies face a lesser carbon energy price than others, and the price of low 
carbon energy is lower than high carbon energy sources, then those firms could receive 
higher earnings and emit less carbon. This may be the case in regions where solar 
energy is cheap and so companies build on-site solar generation. Without information 
about low carbon energy prices faced by specific companies, I cannot control for 
heterogeneity at the firm level. Industry controls do allow me to control for heterogeneity 
at the industry level, and the difference models are only confounded if there is 
heterogeneity in the differences of low carbon energy prices within industries. 
 The next three robustness problems constrain the conclusions that can be 
derived from the results, but do not cause inconsistent coefficient estimates. The 
relationship between carbon emissions and profit may change over time. For example, 
people may care less about carbon emissions during recessions than boom periods. The 
results are robust within the sample time period because of the time dummies, but they 
are not robust out of sample. The results may also not be robust to firms out of sample. 
The sample includes only some of the top 500 largest companies in the world by market 
capitalization based in the United States. This paper’s theoretical model assumes that 
firms are oligarchic. It may not apply to smaller firms in more competitive markets. 
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Finally, differences in knowledge and opinions about climate change between countries 
could result in different coefficients, so conclusions must be limited to the United States. 
 The carbon intensity data come from a survey, and there may be sampling bias 
in the estimates of the coefficients. The bias would arise if survey respondents tend to 
earn more profit and decrease their carbon intensity each year, or vice-versa. Low 
carbon intensity firms may be more likely to respond because they want to publicize their 
results. There is no way to test that hypothesis about carbon intensity. I can, however, 
observe that there is no significant difference in the means of profit between the two 
groups. Table 6 summarizes the profits. 
 
Table 6: Respondents vs Non-respondents 
Group Mean of Logged 
Profit 
Standard Deviation Observations 
Respondents 21.77    0.9845 344 
Non-respondents 21.33     0.9586 123 
 
 The results may be sensitive to outliers. Figure 9 shows the actual and fitted 
values of profit versus carbon intensity for model 4 (the differences model with no 
interaction terms). The farthest outliers have relatively highly positive changes in carbon 
intensity and highly negative changes in logged profit. The two largest such outliers are 
Devon Energy Corporation and Newmont Mining Corporation. Removing both of those 
from the sample results in an insignificant coefficient on change in carbon intensity. On 
the hand, there are some outliers with highly positive changes in profit and no change or 
highly negative change in carbon intensity. Removing Marathon Oil Corporation and 
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Exxon Mobil from the sample at the same time as the other two outliers results in a 
significantly negative coefficient. 
 The overall results seem to be sensitive to the addition and removal of outliers. 
There are two qualifications to that sensitivity. First, results hold if I remove outliers from 
both sides. Second, the outliers tend to be in the energy sector. In fact, all of the top 4 
outliers are from the mining and gas industry. Removing outliers in one industry does not 
significantly affect the coefficient in other industries.  
Figure 921 
 
 
  
                                                          
21 Note that this graph uses colors to differentiate fitted and actual changes. 
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VII. CONCLUSIONS 
 I find evidence to support the hypothesis that lower carbon intensity results in 
greater profit for companies. I develop a theoretical model to explain how consumer 
preference for low carbon intensity products can increase profit for oligarchic companies 
with lower carbon intensity than competitors. Companies play a game in which they 
choose to invest in carbon intensity reduction. The results of the theoretical model are 
ambiguous, emphasizing the need for empirical evidence. 
The empirical evidence supports that carbon intensity decreases profit. The 
results hold up when the model controls for industry effects and differences. The models 
with interaction terms complicate the results. My estimates of the carbon intensity 
elasticity is -0.10. The effect is heterogeneous across industries – I find no effect for 
some industries but a negative coefficient for others. The insignificant coefficients may 
be the result of some industries having fewer observations in the data than others. 
Because of this constraint, I conclude that carbon intensity matters more in some 
industries than other, but I hesitate to say exactly for which industries carbon intensity 
does not matter. The results when revenue is used as the dependent variable instead of 
profit. This means that the results are robust to omitted variables that confound through 
cost. The greatest cause for concern is endogeneity. If profitable companies can invest 
more in carbon intensity reduction, then that would explain the negative coefficient. I 
have no way to address endogeneity other than the theoretical arguments made in 
section III. 
There are potential upgrades to this thesis. While the differenced model does 
some work to control for confounding variables, a fixed effects model would go a long 
way to controlling for time-invariant confounding characteristics of firms. This model 
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requires panel data with more observations for each group than currently available. 
Firm-level data about energy-efficiency and low carbon energy prices would also help to 
give more confidence that these variables do not cause the negative coefficient in these 
models. I would also like to see about whether these results hold for similar companies 
in other countries.  
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Derivation of Equation (6) in the theory section: 
The consumer’s utility function is 
𝑈 = 𝑥1
𝛼𝑥2
𝛽
𝐶𝛾 
The consumer chooses 𝑥1 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑥2 to maximize U subject to their income.  
𝑚𝑎𝑥𝜗𝑥1 𝑥2𝜆
= 𝑥1
𝛼𝑥2
𝛽
𝐶𝛾 − 𝜆(𝑃1𝑥1 + 𝑃2𝑥2 − 𝐼) 
There are three first order conditions: 
(A1) 
𝜕𝜗
𝜕𝑥1
= 𝛼𝑥1
𝛼−1𝑥2
𝛽
𝐶𝛾 + 𝑥1
𝛼𝑥2
𝛽 𝜕𝑈
𝜕𝐶
𝜕𝐶
𝜕𝑥1
− 𝜆𝑃1 = 0 
(A2) 
𝜕𝜗
𝜕𝑥2
= 𝛽𝑥1
𝛼𝑥2
𝛽−1
𝐶𝛾 + 𝑥1
𝛼𝑥2
𝛽 𝜕𝑈
𝜕𝐶
𝜕𝐶
𝜕𝑥2
− 𝜆𝑃2 = 0 
(A3) 
𝜕𝜗
𝜕𝜆
= 𝐼 − 𝑃1𝑥1 − 𝑃2𝑥2 = 0  
Combining equations (A1) and (A2), 
(A4) 
𝑥1
𝛼−1𝑥2
𝛽
𝐶𝛾+𝑥1
𝛼𝑥2
𝛽𝜕𝑈
𝜕𝐶
𝜕𝐶
𝜕𝑥1
𝑃1
=
𝛽𝑥1
𝛼𝑥2
𝛽−1
𝐶𝛾+𝑥1
𝛼𝑥2
𝛽𝜕𝑈
𝜕𝐶
𝜕𝐶
𝜕𝑥2
𝑃2
 
With equations (A4) and (A3), there are two unsolved variables with two different 
equations. By rearranging (A 3) so that only 𝑥2 is on the left hand side, I can substitute 
𝑥2 into (A4). Rearranging gives the demand function 
(A5) 𝑥1 =  
−𝑃2𝐶
𝛾(𝛼+𝛽)
𝑃2
𝜕𝑈
𝜕𝐶
𝜕𝐶
𝜕𝑥1
−
𝜕𝑈
𝜕𝐶
𝜕𝐶
𝜕𝑥2
∗𝑃1−
𝛽𝐶𝛾𝑃2𝑃1
𝐼
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Regressions Table 1: No interactions 
 (E1) (E2) (E3) (E4) 
VARIABLES logEarnings logEarnings logEarnings D.logEarnings 
     
Carbon Intensity -210.5*** -231.1*** -224.7*** -445.2*** 
 (45.9) (53.7) (49.7) (107.6) 
     
Construction  -0.489 -0.781 0.0116 
  (0.586) (0.544) (0.555) 
     
Entertainment  -0.825 -0.798 0.0560 
  (0.586) (0.543) (0.523) 
     
Finance and Insurance  -1.091** -1.649*** 0.118 
  (0.471) (0.443) (0.442) 
     
Food Services  -2.729*** -2.635*** -1.213** 
  (0.692) (0.641) (0.604) 
     
Information  -0.845* -0.849* 0.0813 
  (0.483) (0.447) (0.451) 
     
Manufacturing 1  -1.427** -1.370*** -0.177 
  (0.568) (0.527) (0.524) 
     
Manufacturing 2  -0.832* -0.797* -0.0441 
  (0.473) (0.438) (0.442) 
     
Manufacturing 3  -1.398*** -1.347*** 0.0632 
  (0.476) (0.441) (0.445) 
     
Mining and Gas 
Extraction 
 -0.971** -0.961** -0.153 
  (0.478) (0.443) (0.450) 
     
Scientific and Technical 
Services 
 -1.624*** -1.550*** 0.101 
  (0.546) (0.506) (0.506) 
     
Real Estate  -2.440*** -2.367*** 0.238 
  (0.609) (0.564) (0.552) 
     
Retail Trade 1  -1.191** -1.156** -0.0929 
  (0.492) (0.455) (0.462) 
     
Retail Trade 2  -1.144** -1.113** 0.0391 
  (0.525) (0.486) (0.485) 
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Transportation  -1.299** -1.238*** 0.0129 
  (0.509) (0.471) (0.468) 
     
     
Utilities  -1.316** -1.287*** -0.0918 
  (0.524) (0.486) (0.485) 
     
Wholesale Trade  -1.635*** -1.562*** 0.0478 
  (0.484) (0.449) (0.453) 
     
Assets   0*** 0 
   (0) (0) 
     
     
2012 -0.199 -0.178 -0.171  
 (0.126) (0.120) (0.111)  
     
2013 0.0280 0.0261 0.0495 0.282*** 
 (0.128) (0.122) (0.113) (0.0871) 
     
Constant 21.93*** 23.10*** 22.98*** -0.123 
 (0.0940) (0.459) (0.425) (0.430) 
     
Observations 343 343 343 197 
     
Adjusted R-squared 0.0617 0.1602 0.2791 0.1270 
F-Stat 8.47 4.42 7.60 2.50 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Regression Table 2: Interaction Models 
 (E5) (E6) 
VARIABLES logEarnings D.logEarnings 
Construction -1.177* -0.658 
 (0.682) (1.378) 
   
Entertainment -1.794** -0.482 
 (0.763) (1.347) 
   
Finance and Insurance -1.949*** -0.504 
 (0.485) (1.308) 
   
Food Services -3.165 -2.604* 
 (2.734) (1.380) 
   
Information -0.979* -0.457 
 (0.502) (1.311) 
   
Manufacturing 1 -0.741 -0.752 
 (0.702) (1.336) 
   
Manufacturing 2 -1.277*** -0.583 
 (0.484) (1.309) 
   
Manufacturing 3 -1.748*** -0.534 
 (0.495) (1.309) 
   
Mining and Gas Extraction -1.062** -0.665 
 (0.502) (1.310) 
   
Scientific and Technical Services -2.147*** -0.571 
 (0.779) (1.377) 
   
Real Estate -0.802 -0.617 
 (3.348) (1.535) 
   
Retail Trade 1 -1.850*** -0.673 
 (0.500) (1.314) 
   
Retail Trade 2 -2.741*** -0.797 
 (0.711) (1.510) 
   
Transportation -2.335*** -0.554 
 (0.882) (1.316) 
   
Utilities -2.183*** -0.730 
 (0.557) (1.322) 
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Wholesale Trade -2.261*** -0.507 
 (0.504) (1.311) 
   
Administrative and Waste 
Management#Carbon Intensity 
-670*** -22.7 
 (228) (59.4) 
   
Construction#Carbon Intensity -916 -3.15 
 (1804) (6.77) 
   
Entertainment#Carbon Intensity 10084 -0.319 
 (10643) (200) 
   
Finance and Insurance#Carbon Intensity -6594*** -1.04*** 
 (2464) (0.315) 
   
Food Services#Carbon Intensity 897 -6.00*** 
 (18356) (1.42) 
   
Information#Carbon Intensity -3758*** -0.336 
 (1311) (0.511) 
   
Manufacturing 1#Carbon Intensity -2442*** -2.95 
 (853) (5.53) 
   
Manufacturing 2#Carbon Intensity -230*** -0.813 
 (79) (0.379) 
   
Manufacturing 3#Carbon Intensity -1191 -0.969** 
 (1235) (0.359) 
   
Mining and Gas Extraction#Carbon 
Intensity 
-590*** -1.13*** 
 (134) (0.269) 
   
Scientific and Technical Services#Carbon 
Intensity 
2409 -0.423 
 (9299) (3.62) 
   
Real Estate#Carbon Intensity -9575 -5.26 
 (14089) (5.76) 
   
Retail Trade 1#Carbon Intensity 436 -0.377 
 (295) (0.288) 
   
Retail Trade 2#Carbon Intensity 15446** -0.203 
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 (6411) (0.802) 
   
Transportation#Carbon Intensity 400 -3.89 
 (764) (4.04) 
   
Utilities#Carbon Intensity -94 -0.265 
 (72) (0.643) 
   
Wholesale Trade#Carbon Intensity 567 -0.582 
 (496) (0.524) 
   
Assets 0*** -0 
 (0) (0) 
   
2012 -0.190*  
 (0.106)  
   
2013 0.0490 0.311*** 
 (0.108) (0.0870) 
   
Constant 23.47*** 0.424 
 (0.469) (1.299) 
   
Observations 342 197 
   
F-Stat 6.30 2.84 
Adjusted R-squared 0.346 0.2470 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 6: Companies in Sample   
 company   year  
 ---------------------------------------------- 
1. 3M Company   2011  
2. 3M Company   2012  
3. 3M Company   2013  
4. AFLAC Incorporated   2011  
5. AFLAC Incorporated   2012  
 ---------------------------------------------- 
6. AFLAC Incorporated   2013  
7. AT&T Inc.   2011  
8. AT&T Inc.   2012  
9. AT&T Inc.   2013  
10. Abbott Laboratories   2011  
 ---------------------------------------------- 
11. Abbott Laboratories   2012  
12. Abbott Laboratories   2013  
13. Adobe Systems, Inc.   2013  
14. Aetna Inc.   2012  
15. Air Products & Chemicals, Inc.   2011  
 ---------------------------------------------- 
16. Air Products & Chemicals, Inc.   2012  
17. Air Products & Chemicals, Inc.   2013  
18. Allergan, Inc.   2011  
19. Allergan, Inc.   2012  
20. Allergan, Inc.   2013  
 ---------------------------------------------- 
21. Allstate Corporation   2011  
22. Allstate Corporation   2013  
23. Altria Group, Inc.   2011  
24. Altria Group, Inc.   2012  
25. American Express   2011  
 ---------------------------------------------- 
26. American Express   2012  
27. American Express   2013  
28. American Tower Corp.   2011  
29. Amgen, Inc.   2011  
30. Amgen, Inc.   2012  
 ---------------------------------------------- 
31. Amgen, Inc.   2013  
32. Anadarko Petroleum Corporation   2011  
33. Anadarko Petroleum Corporation   2013  
34. Apache Corporation   2011  
35. Apache Corporation   2012  
 ---------------------------------------------- 
36. Apache Corporation   2013  
37. Automatic Data Processing, Inc.   2011  
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38. Automatic Data Processing, Inc.   2012  
39. Automatic Data Processing, Inc.   2013  
40. BB&T Corporation   2011  
 ---------------------------------------------- 
41. Baker Hughes Incorporated   2011  
42. Baker Hughes Incorporated   2012  
43. Baker Hughes Incorporated   2013  
44. Bank of America   2011  
45. Bank of America   2012  
 ---------------------------------------------- 
46. Bank of America   2013  
47. Baxter International Inc.   2011  
48. Baxter International Inc.   2012  
49. Baxter International Inc.   2013  
50. Becton, Dickinson and Co.   2011  
 ---------------------------------------------- 
51. Becton, Dickinson and Co.   2012  
52. Best Buy Co., Inc.   2011  
53. Biogen Idec Inc.   2012  
54. Biogen Idec Inc.   2013  
55. Boeing Company   2011  
 ---------------------------------------------- 
56. Boeing Company   2012  
57. Boeing Company   2013  
58. Bristol-Myers Squibb   2011  
59. Bristol-Myers Squibb   2012  
60. Bristol-Myers Squibb   2013  
 ---------------------------------------------- 
61. CSX Corporation   2011  
62. CSX Corporation   2012  
63. CSX Corporation   2013  
64. CVS Caremark Corporation   2011  
65. CVS Caremark Corporation   2012  
 ---------------------------------------------- 
66. CVS Caremark Corporation   2013  
67. Capital One Financial   2011  
68. Capital One Financial   2012  
69. Capital One Financial   2013  
70. Caterpillar Inc.   2011  
 ---------------------------------------------- 
71. Celgene Corporation   2011  
72. Celgene Corporation   2012  
73. Celgene Corporation   2013  
74. CenturyLink   2012  
75. CenturyLink   2013  
 ---------------------------------------------- 
76. Chevron Corporation   2011  
77. Chevron Corporation   2012  
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78. Chevron Corporation   2013  
79. Cisco Systems, Inc.   2011  
80. Cisco Systems, Inc.   2012  
 ---------------------------------------------- 
81. Cisco Systems, Inc.   2013  
82. Citigroup Inc.   2011  
83. Citigroup Inc.   2012  
84. Citigroup Inc.   2013  
85. Cognizant Technology Solutions Corp.   2011  
 ---------------------------------------------- 
86. Cognizant Technology Solutions Corp.   2012  
87. Cognizant Technology Solutions Corp.   2013  
88. Colgate Palmolive Company   2011  
89. Colgate Palmolive Company   2012  
90. ConocoPhillips   2011  
 ---------------------------------------------- 
91. ConocoPhillips   2012  
92. ConocoPhillips   2013  
93. Consolidated Edison, Inc.   2012  
94. Corning Incorporated   2011  
95. Corning Incorporated   2012  
 ---------------------------------------------- 
96. Corning Incorporated   2013  
97. Costco Wholesale Corporation   2012  
98. Costco Wholesale Corporation   2013  
99. Cummins Inc.   2013  
100. Deere & Company   2011  
 ---------------------------------------------- 
101. Deere & Company   2012  
102. Deere & Company   2013  
103. Dell Inc.   2011  
104. Dell Inc.   2012  
105. Devon Energy Corporation   2011  
 ---------------------------------------------- 
106. Devon Energy Corporation   2012  
107. Dominion Resources, Inc.   2011  
108. Dominion Resources, Inc.   2012  
109. Dow Chemical Company   2011  
110. Dow Chemical Company   2012  
 ---------------------------------------------- 
111. Dow Chemical Company   2013  
112. E.I. du Pont de Nemours and Company   2011  
113. E.I. du Pont de Nemours and Company   2012  
114. E.I. du Pont de Nemours and Company   2013  
115. EMC Corporation   2011  
 ---------------------------------------------- 
116. EMC Corporation   2012  
117. EMC Corporation   2013  
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118. Eaton Corporation   2013  
119. Ecolab Inc.   2012  
120. Ecolab Inc.   2013  
 ---------------------------------------------- 
121. Eli Lilly & Co.   2011  
122. Eli Lilly & Co.   2012  
123. Eli Lilly & Co.   2013  
124. Exelon Corporation   2011  
125. Exelon Corporation   2012  
 ---------------------------------------------- 
126. Exelon Corporation   2013  
127. Express Scripts Holding Company   2011  
128. Express Scripts Holding Company   2012  
129. Exxon Mobil Corporation   2011  
130. Exxon Mobil Corporation   2012  
 ---------------------------------------------- 
131. Exxon Mobil Corporation   2013  
132. FedEx Corporation   2011  
133. FedEx Corporation   2012  
134. FedEx Corporation   2013  
135. Ford Motor Company   2012  
 ---------------------------------------------- 
136. Ford Motor Company   2013  
137. Franklin Resources, Inc.   2011  
138. Franklin Resources, Inc.   2012  
139. Franklin Resources, Inc.   2013  
140. Freeport-McMoRan Copper & Gold Inc.   2011  
 ---------------------------------------------- 
141. Freeport-McMoRan Copper & Gold Inc.   2012  
142. Freeport-McMoRan Copper & Gold Inc.   2013  
143. General Electric Company   2011  
144. General Electric Company   2012  
145. General Electric Company   2013  
 ---------------------------------------------- 
146. General Mills Inc.   2011  
147. General Mills Inc.   2012  
148. General Mills Inc.   2013  
149. General Motors Company   2012  
150. General Motors Company   2013  
 ---------------------------------------------- 
151. Gilead Sciences, Inc.   2011  
152. Gilead Sciences, Inc.   2012  
153. Goldman Sachs Group Inc.   2011  
154. Goldman Sachs Group Inc.   2012  
155. Goldman Sachs Group Inc.   2013  
 ---------------------------------------------- 
156. Google Inc.   2011  
157. Google Inc.   2012  
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158. Google Inc.   2013  
159. H.J. Heinz Company   2012  
160. HCP Inc.   2012  
 ---------------------------------------------- 
161. HCP Inc.   2013  
162. Halliburton Company   2012  
163. Halliburton Company   2013  
164. Hess Corporation   2011  
165. Hess Corporation   2012  
 ---------------------------------------------- 
166. Hess Corporation   2013  
167. Hewlett-Packard   2011  
168. Hewlett-Packard   2012  
169. Hewlett-Packard   2013  
170. Honeywell International Inc.   2012  
 ---------------------------------------------- 
171. Honeywell International Inc.   2013  
172. Intel Corporation   2011  
173. Intel Corporation   2012  
174. Intel Corporation   2013  
175. International Business Machines (IBM)   2011  
 ---------------------------------------------- 
176. International Business Machines (IBM)   2012  
177. International Business Machines (IBM)   2013  
178. Intuit Inc.   2012  
179. JPMorgan Chase & Co.   2011  
180. JPMorgan Chase & Co.   2012  
 ---------------------------------------------- 
181. JPMorgan Chase & Co.   2013  
182. Johnson & Johnson   2011  
183. Johnson & Johnson   2012  
184. Johnson & Johnson   2013  
185. Johnson Controls   2011  
 ---------------------------------------------- 
186. Johnson Controls   2012  
187. Johnson Controls   2013  
188. Kellogg Company   2011  
189. Kellogg Company   2012  
190. Kellogg Company   2013  
 ---------------------------------------------- 
191. Kimberly-Clark Corporation   2011  
192. Kimberly-Clark Corporation   2012  
193. Kimberly-Clark Corporation   2013  
194. Kohl's Corporation   2011  
195. Lockheed Martin Corporation   2011  
 ---------------------------------------------- 
196. Lowe's Companies, Inc.   2012  
197. Lowe's Companies, Inc.   2013  
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198. Marathon Oil Corporation   2011  
199. Marathon Oil Corporation   2012  
200. Marsh & McLennan Companies, Inc.   2012  
 ---------------------------------------------- 
201. Marsh & McLennan Companies, Inc.   2013  
202. MasterCard Incorporated   2013  
203. Medtronic, Inc.   2011  
204. Medtronic, Inc.   2012  
205. Medtronic, Inc.   2013  
 ---------------------------------------------- 
206. Merck & Co., Inc.   2011  
207. Merck & Co., Inc.   2012  
208. Merck & Co., Inc.   2013  
209. MetLife, Inc.   2012  
210. Microsoft Corporation   2011  
 ---------------------------------------------- 
211. Microsoft Corporation   2012  
212. Microsoft Corporation   2013  
213. Monsanto Company   2011  
214. Monsanto Company   2012  
215. Monsanto Company   2013  
 ---------------------------------------------- 
216. Morgan Stanley   2011  
217. Morgan Stanley   2012  
218. Morgan Stanley   2013  
219. Motorola Solutions   2011  
220. NIKE Inc.   2011  
 ---------------------------------------------- 
221. NIKE Inc.   2012  
222. NetApp Inc.   2011  
223. Newmont Mining Corporation   2011  
224. Newmont Mining Corporation   2012  
225. Newmont Mining Corporation   2013  
 ---------------------------------------------- 
226. Noble Energy, Inc.   2012  
227. Noble Energy, Inc.   2013  
228. Norfolk Southern Corp.   2011  
229. Norfolk Southern Corp.   2012  
230. Norfolk Southern Corp.   2013  
 ---------------------------------------------- 
231. Northrop Grumman Corp   2011  
232. Occidental Petroleum Corporation   2011  
233. Occidental Petroleum Corporation   2012  
234. Occidental Petroleum Corporation   2013  
235. Oracle Corporation   2011  
 ---------------------------------------------- 
236. Oracle Corporation   2013  
237. PG&E Corporation   2011  
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238. PG&E Corporation   2012  
239. PNC Financial Services Group, Inc.   2011  
240. PNC Financial Services Group, Inc.   2012  
 ---------------------------------------------- 
241. PNC Financial Services Group, Inc.   2013  
242. PPG Industries, Inc.   2013  
243. PepsiCo, Inc.   2011  
244. PepsiCo, Inc.   2012  
245. PepsiCo, Inc.   2013  
 ---------------------------------------------- 
246. Pfizer Inc.   2011  
247. Pfizer Inc.   2012  
248. Pfizer Inc.   2013  
249. Praxair, Inc.   2011  
250. Praxair, Inc.   2012  
 ---------------------------------------------- 
251. Praxair, Inc.   2013  
252. Procter & Gamble Company   2011  
253. Procter & Gamble Company   2012  
254. Procter & Gamble Company   2013  
255. Prudential Financial, Inc.   2011  
 ---------------------------------------------- 
256. Prudential Financial, Inc.   2012  
257. Prudential Financial, Inc.   2013  
258. Public Service Enterprise Group Inc.   2011  
259. QUALCOMM Inc.   2011  
260. QUALCOMM Inc.   2012  
 ---------------------------------------------- 
261. QUALCOMM Inc.   2013  
262. Raytheon Company   2011  
263. Raytheon Company   2012  
264. Raytheon Company   2013  
265. Reynolds American Inc.   2011  
 ---------------------------------------------- 
266. Reynolds American Inc.   2012  
267. Reynolds American Inc.   2013  
268. Schlumberger Limited   2011  
269. Schlumberger Limited   2012  
270. Schlumberger Limited   2013  
 ---------------------------------------------- 
271. Simon Property Group   2011  
272. Simon Property Group   2012  
273. Simon Property Group   2013  
274. Spectra Energy Corp   2012  
275. Spectra Energy Corp   2013  
 ---------------------------------------------- 
276. Starbucks Corporation   2011  
277. Starbucks Corporation   2012  
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278. Starbucks Corporation   2013  
279. State Street Corporation   2011  
280. State Street Corporation   2012  
 ---------------------------------------------- 
281. State Street Corporation   2013  
282. Sysco Corporation   2013  
283. TJX Companies, Inc.   2011  
284. TJX Companies, Inc.   2012  
285. TJX Companies, Inc.   2013  
 ---------------------------------------------- 
286. Target Corporation   2011  
287. Target Corporation   2012  
288. Target Corporation   2013  
289. Texas Instruments Incorporated   2011  
290. Texas Instruments Incorporated   2012  
 ---------------------------------------------- 
291. Texas Instruments Incorporated   2013  
292. The Chubb Corporation   2012  
293. The Chubb Corporation   2013  
294. The Coca-Cola Company   2012  
295. The Coca-Cola Company   2013  
 ---------------------------------------------- 
296. The Home Depot, Inc.   2011  
297. The Home Depot, Inc.   2012  
298. The Home Depot, Inc.   2013  
299. The Travelers Companies, Inc.   2011  
300. The Travelers Companies, Inc.   2012  
 ---------------------------------------------- 
301. The Travelers Companies, Inc.   2013  
302. Thermo Fisher Scientific Inc.   2012  
303. Thermo Fisher Scientific Inc.   2013  
304. Time Warner Inc.   2011  
305. Time Warner Inc.   2012  
 ---------------------------------------------- 
306. Time Warner Inc.   2013  
307. U.S. Bancorp   2011  
308. U.S. Bancorp   2012  
309. U.S. Bancorp   2013  
310. UPS   2011  
 ---------------------------------------------- 
311. UPS   2012  
312. UPS   2013  
313. Union Pacific Corporation   2011  
314. Union Pacific Corporation   2012  
315. Union Pacific Corporation   2013  
 ---------------------------------------------- 
316. United Technologies Corporation   2011  
317. United Technologies Corporation   2012  
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318. United Technologies Corporation   2013  
319. UnitedHealth Group Inc   2012  
320. UnitedHealth Group Inc   2013  
 ---------------------------------------------- 
321. Ventas Inc   2013  
322. Verizon Communications Inc.   2011  
323. Verizon Communications Inc.   2012  
324. Verizon Communications Inc.   2013  
325. Visa   2013  
 ---------------------------------------------- 
326. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.   2011  
327. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.   2012  
328. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.   2013  
329. Walgreen Company   2011  
330. Walt Disney Company   2011  
 ---------------------------------------------- 
331. Walt Disney Company   2012  
332. Walt Disney Company   2013  
333. Waste Management, Inc.   2011  
334. Wells Fargo & Company   2011  
335. Wells Fargo & Company   2012  
 ---------------------------------------------- 
336. Wells Fargo & Company   2013  
337. Yahoo! Inc.   2012  
338. Yahoo! Inc.   2013  
339. Yum! Brands, Inc.   2012  
340. Yum! Brands, Inc.   2013  
 ---------------------------------------------- 
341. eBay Inc.   2011  
342. eBay Inc.   2012  
343. eBay Inc.   2013  
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